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National Endowment for the Humanities. One of the eight essay-
ists, L. Peter Schultz, is described as "working for the National En-
dowment for the Humanities." The Endowment, its staff, and its 
grantees (and their editors) should, I think, be more careful to ob-
serve the proprieties and to avoid the appearance of backscratching 
in matters such as this. 
In short, this volume offers less than it should. It has its 
strengths-the essays of Ceaser, Gwyn, and Wilson-but it all adds 
up to les~ than the sum of the parts. The best advice I could give a 
reader interested in the kind of institutional reform propounded 
here would be to take a look at James Sundquist's Constitutional 
Reform and Effective Government, published in 1986 by the Brook-
ings Institution. It, too, suffers from some degree of institutional 
formalism and a neglect of extrainstitutional political processes, but 
it is far more knowing about the realities of policymaking and insti-
tutionallife. In the battle of the Washington think tanks, score this 
round for Brookings. 
THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACf. By Charles Whalen1 
and Barbara Whalen.z Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press. 
1985. Pp. XX, 289. $16.95. 
Michael R. Belknap 3 
For years lawyers and historians have needed a good history of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is probably the most important 
civil rights statute ever enacted by Congress. Scholars have chroni-
cled the enactment of the less significant Civil Rights Acts of 1957,4 
1960,s and 1968,6 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.7 But the gi-
I. Former member of the United States House of Representatives (1967-1979). 
2. Former newspaper columnist, advertising account executive, and television station 
employee. 
3. Professor of Law, California Western School of Law and Lecturer in History, San 
Diego State University. 
4. See J. ANDERSON, EISENHOWER, BROWNELL AND THE CONGRESS (1964); R. 
BURK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 204-26 (1984); S. 
LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS 140-202 (1976). 
5. See M. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER 53-69 (1987); D. 
BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW (2d ed. 1966); S. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 220-49. 
6. See M. BELKNAP, supra note 5, at 205-28; J. HARVIE, BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS DUR-
ING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 36-57 (1973); S. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER 43-
88 (1985). 
7. See D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA 31-132 (1978); S. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 
307-25. 
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gantic piles of documents that record the progress of the 1964 mea-
sure through the legislative process have long intimidated potential 
historians of that law. Just reading the published Senate debates on 
an act that was filibustered for a record 534 hours promised to take 
years. Not until Charles and Barbara Whalen's The Longest Debate 
had anyone dared to attempt a legislative history of this statute. 
They deserve applause for undertaking such a herculean task. Un-
fortunately, the book that their labors have yielded is for a number 
of reasons disappointing. 
Although neither trained as historians nor experienced in his-
torical research, the Whalens have done a competent job of tracing 
the progress through Congress of the bill that became the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. They follow H.R. 7152 from the House Judici-
ary Committee, through the House Rules Committee (chaired by 
that arch foe of civil rights legislation, "Judge" Howard Smith of 
Virginia), to passage on the House floor, then on through a seem-
ingly interminable filibuster to victory in the Senate, back to the 
House again, and finally up to the White House, to be signed by 
President Johnson in the presence of legislators from both parties, 
Justice Department officials, and leaders of the civil rights move-
ment, all of whom had helped to bring about its passage. 
The Whalens' focus is perhaps a bit too narrow. A really com-
plete history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would devote some 
attention to the bills introduced in the Senate that never reached the 
floor there, as well as to the House measure that was ultimately 
enacted. 
They are careful, however, to relate the progress of the legisla-
tion that they do discuss to developments outside Congress. Point-
ing to the way that the nation reacted to the violence that 
segregationists used to resist civil rights demonstrations in Birming-
ham, Alabama, the Whalens assert that, "In the spring of 1963, 
events unleashed such a public clamor, such a torrent of indignation 
that, at last, the President and Congress were forced to confront the 
national disgrace of racial discrimination. The result was passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Of course, that law was not enacted 
until after the president who introduced it, John F. Kennedy, had 
been assassinated. The Whalens also emphasize the impact of pub-
lic reaction to Kennedy's death on what had been during its first 
session a notably unproductive 88th Congress. "Mourning the 
murder of the charismatic young president, Americans turned their 
wrath on the body of stubborn old men who had denied him his 
requests. Congress found itself in trouble with the people who re-
ally counted - the people at home." Their constituents prodded 
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reluctant legislators into enacting the civil rights bill. Particularly 
effective, the Whalens contend, was the lobbying done by church 
groups. It won over legislators from states where civil rights orga-
nizations had few members and also placed opponents of the legisla-
tion on the defensive with respect to what the clergymen effectively 
managed to define as a moral issue.s 
The Whalens occasionally resort to a tired cliche; in describing 
Howard Smith's unsuccessful efforts to stave off defeat at the hands 
of insurgents in his own Rules Committee, for example, they report 
that "[t]he judge had gone down swinging." Generally, however, 
they write well. Typical is a sentence that brilliantly captures the 
situation created by more than a dozen weeks of southern filibuster 
against H.R. 7152: "On the Hill that Wednesday afternoon, as so 
often happened in the Senate, everyone was all talked out but no 
one knew how to stop." Particularly well-written are the Whalens' 
sketches of some of the principal characters in the congressional 
battle, especially Judge Smith, Representative William McCulloch, 
Representative Emanuel Celler, and Senator Mike Mansfield. 
The authors also do a marvelous job of describing the drama of 
the lengthy legislative struggle. Their readers will share the "happi-
ness and heartbreak" of Hubert Humphrey, the Senate floor man-
ager of the bill, who learned, just as he was about to achieve the 
greatest triumph of his legislative career, that his son Robert had 
been stricken with cancer. Even more gripping is the picture that 
the Whalens paint of the dying Senator Clair Engel being pushed 
into the Senate chamber in a wheelchair to cast his vote to end the 
southern filibuster. "Engel, unable to speak, feebly lifted his hand 
three times and pointed toward his eye," they report. " 'I guess that 
means aye,' murmured the clerk." After the Senate vote for clo-
ture, the reader shares a poignant moment with the leader of the 
defeated southern Senators, Richard Russell, and the lobbyist for 
the NAACP, Clarence Mitchell. As these two old adversaries, one 
representing a vanquished segregationist South and the other an ad-
vocate for the triumphant forces of the civil rights movement, left 
the Senate together 
Russell praised Hubert Humphrey for his fairness, his willingness to permit oppo-
nents of H.R. 7152 to have their say, and his refusal to use parliamentary tactics 
that might have embarrassed southern senators. Russell told Mitchell that without 
the lengthy floor fight which, thanks to Humphrey's patience, he and others were 
8. In emphasizing the importance of lobbying by church groups, the Whalens have the 
support of historian Carl Brauer. He writes: "The clerical lobby would prove particularly 
valuable in winning over Congressmen and Senators from districts and states where blacks 
and labor groups Jacked influence." C. BRAUER, JOHN f. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION 275 (1977). 
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able to wage, the bill would not be enforceable in the South. But, he felt, having 
seen their senators defeated in a fair legislative battle, Southerners would now ac-
cept Congress's verdict and abide by the law which would soon be enacted. 
The Whalens provide some valuable insights into the legislative 
process. Charles, a former member of Congress, is somewhat cyni-
cal about the body to which he once belonged, characterizing it at 
one point as a "535-headed creature, whose strongest interest was 
self-preservation .... " Yet his years on Capitol Hill taught Whalen 
much about how the creature functions. He carefully explains such 
matters as how House committees went about "marking up" a bill 
in 1963 and what eight steps a bill had to go through to achieve 
passage by the Senate. 
The Longest Debate also provides interesting insights into the 
particular legislative process that produced the Civil Rights Act. 
One factor which the authors highlight is the interrelationship be-
tween that statute and Kennedy's tax bill, which was also pending 
in Congress when he died. Representative Celler, who chaired the 
House Judiciary Committee, repeatedly stalled action on the civil 
rights measure in order to prevent the alienation of southerners, 
whose support the administration needed to secure enactment of the 
tax proposal. 
The Whalens also include some excellent descriptions of how 
the sensibilities and personalities of legislators affected the progress 
of H.R. 7152 through the House and Senate. The book's first real 
high point is a discussion of Attorney General Robert Kennedy's 
disastrous appearance before a subcommittee of the House Judici-
ary Committee. During his testimony, Kennedy curtly informed 
Representative John Lindsay, a New York Republican, who had 
himself introduced a public accommodations measure even before 
the administration sent its legislation to the Hill, that his time was 
too valuable to be wasted reading bills submitted by members of 
Congress. "Kennedy's political instincts failed him," the Whalens 
observe. "His thoughtless remarks damaged his brother's bill, 
which would need 50 or 60 Republican votes to get through the 
House." 
The Attorney General's gaffe forced the Justice Department to 
enter into negotiations with William McCulloch, the ranking Re-
publican on the Judiciary Committee. McCulloch, a fellow Ohioan, 
is the hero of the Whalens' story. They relate how he worked with 
Justice Department leaders to construct a bill that Republican lead-
ers could support. After Judiciary Committee Chair Emanuel Cel-
ler almost destroyed chances for passing the legislation by 
toughening it to the point where it could never have secured suffi.-
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cient votes, McCulloch rewrote it with Lindsay's assistance, helped 
Celler ram the revised version through their committee, and then 
held a series of meetings to reconcile the differences among his fel-
low Republicans. He also demanded and got from the administra-
tion, as the price of his support, a veto over any changes that might 
be proposed in the Senate. In this way, according to the Whalens, 
McCulloch prevented Lyndon Johnson and the Justice Department 
from trading away provisions adopted by the House in order to get 
southerners to halt their filibuster in the upper chamber. Thus, he 
saved the 1964 civil rights bill from being gutted, as its 1957 and 
1960 predecessors had been. 
The Whalens' treatment of Celler is as contemptuous as their 
description of McCulloch is laudatory. They characterize the 
venerable Brooklyn liberal as an inept schemer, whose Machiavel-
lian maneuvering nearly killed the statute in its cradle. As the 
Whalens tell the story, Celler agreed to have a subcommittee which 
he controlled add to the Kennedy administration's bill a number of 
strengthening amendments demanded by civil rights lobbyists. He 
intended to get credit for supporting these additions, then use them 
for trading purposes with Republicans and southern Democrats on 
the full committee. To his surprise, rather than being whittled back 
as he anticipated, the strengthened bill nearly wound up being sent 
to the floor by a coalition of liberals, who liked the changes, and 
conservatives, who knew that these would offend so many members 
that the bill could not pass the House. McCulloch and lawyers 
from the Justice Department saved the day by fashioning a moder-
ate compromise capable of being passed. 
In addition to presenting Celler in an extremely unflattering 
light, the Whalens also deflate considerably the legend of Senate 
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen's miraculous conversion to the 
cause of civil rights. Dirksen's assistance was essential to support-
ers of the bill, for without it they lacked the two-thirds majority 
needed to halt the southern filibuster with cloture. At first he op-
posed H.R. 7152, objecting to both Title II (Public Accommoda-
tions) and Title VII (Equal Employment). Then in mid-May of 
1964 he negotiated a compromise with the administration and Sen-
ate supporters of the legislation. More than that, Dirksen suddenly 
became an evangelistic champion of civil rights legislation, melodra-
matically proclaiming to reporters, "No army is stronger than an 
idea whose time has come." While this turnaround appeared as 
sudden and complete as a religious conversion, "[a]ctually Dirk-
sen's conversion was no conversion at all. It was simply the last 
scene in a script whose ending he had written several months 
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before." The minority leader lacked the flexibility to make any sig-
nificant changes in the House-approved bill. Yet he had to rewrite 
it in order to reassure the conservative members of his own party. 
At the same time, he had to do this in a way that would retain the 
substance of the original measure, or risk losing the backing of GOP 
liberals. His "conversion" was part of an elaborate flim-flam, the 
objective of which was to bring to the Senate floor as a loudly-her-
alded "Dirksen substitute" what was really the "old H.R. 7152 in 
disguise." 
While excellent at analyzing the motives and maneuvers of 
congressional actors and at recreating the drama of the legislative 
struggle that produced an historic law, the Whalens have written a 
book which probably will fail to satisfy most scholars. Although 
Charles was able to draw on his congressional experience, neither 
he nor his wife has formal training in law or history. It shows. The 
book's first deficiency is that it lacks a bibliography. This might be 
tolerable if the notes were adequate, but they are not. The Whalens 
have included endnotes at the back of the book, but no numbers in 
the text to guide the reader to the source of particular material 
there. Instead, notes begin with a page number and a few words 
from somewhere on that page. Although they are apparently in-
tended to clarify what is being documented, these confusing entries 
generally serve only to initiate frustrating hunts through the text in 
search of the few words that will link an endnote to the passage that 
it documents. Another disturbing aspect of the Whalens documen-
tation is the fact that they occasionally make assertions about what 
particular individuals were thinking, which could not possibly be 
based on any source they cite in their notes. 
These faults make assessing their research difficult. So does the 
fact that they do not know how to cite properly material in the 
White House Central Files at the Kennedy and Johnson presiden-
tial libraries. So far as one can determine, however, the Whalens 
appear to have consulted most of the appropriate manuscript collec-
tions in those repositories (the principal exception being the papers 
of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall at the Kennedy Li-
brary). They have also travelled the country from Athens, Georgia 
to Minneapolis, Minnesota, doing research in the collections of 
Richard Russell, William McCulloch, Everett Dirksen, Hubert 
Humphrey, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and the 
NAACP. In addition, the Whalens have made extensive use of oral 
histories and have interviewed many of the principal actors in the 
H.R. 7152 drama. They have also exploited unpublished as well as 
published congressional records. 
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While their primary research seems generally sound, their sec-
ondary research is inadequate. They have managed to overlook the 
single most obvious book on their subject, Carl M. Brauer's John F. 
Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction (1977). Although discuss-
ing how Howard Smith's efforts to defeat H.R. 7152 led the House 
to add to the list of types of employment discrimination forbidden 
by Title VII a prohibition of any discrimination based on sex, they 
fail to cite Brauer's important article on that subject.9 The Whalens 
apparently did not peruse Schlesinger's Robert Kennedy and His 
Times (1978), and while citing most of the major biographies of 
John Kennedy, they seem to have examined none of those on Lyn-
don Johnson. They discuss the civil rights record of President 
Dwight Eisenhower, yet fail to cite the best work on that subject.w 
Nor do the endnotes offer any hint that they are aware of the major 
works on the principal civil rights organizations that were available 
when they wrote.'' 
It may seem a bit pedantic to fault nonprofessionals for their 
lack of familiarity with the scholarly literature of American history, 
but the Whalens' inadequate secondary research has produced a 
book that is marred by factual errors. For example, they errone-
ously attribute passage of the 1960 civil rights act to publicity about 
lunch counter sit-ins'z and claim that the 1957 act was due to public 
indignation over the Montgomery bus boycott. 13 Their lack of his-
torical expertise is particularly evident in their Introduction, which 
is a sort of background chapter. They misquote the Emancipation 
Proclamation'4 and offer generalizations about Reconstruction'5 
9. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Dis-
crimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 49 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 37 (1983). 
10. See R. BURK, supra note 4. 
II. See, e.g., C. CARSON, IN STRUGGLE (1981) (on the Student Non-violent Coordinat-
ing Committee); A. MEIER & E. RuowrcK, CORE (1973) (on the Congress of Racial Equal-
ity); H. ZINN, SNCC (1965) (also on the SNCC); E. Schmeidler, Shaping Ideas and Action 
(1980) (U. of Mich. Ph.D. dissertation on CORE, SNCC, and the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference). 
12. Contra M. BELKNAP, supra note 5, at 56-59, 64-66; S. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 
221-22, 231-32, 236, and 247. 
13. Contra S. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 142-54, 165-66, 199-200; R. BURK, supra note 
4, at 206-10, 218-19, 225-26. 
14. According to the Whalens, the Proclamation stated simply: "'All persons held as 
slaves ... shall be ... forever free.' " The most grievous distortion here is their failure to 
indicate that it applied only to slaves in those states and parts of states still in rebellion 
against the Union government as of January I, 1863. They create the impression that the 
Emancipation Proclamation freed all of the slaves in the United States, which it clearly did 
not. 
15. "A vindictive Congress set up a Reconstruction program designed to humiliate the 
white people of the South." This assertion is contradicted by the whole vast body of revision-
ist scholarship on Reconstruction published since the early 1960s. See generally K. STAMPP, 
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and the economic impact of the New Deal on blackst6 that scholars 
have long since refuted. Their inadequate secondary research pro-
duced errors of omission as well as of commission. For example, 
the Whalens fail to point out that initially President Kennedy was 
inclined to request a fairly restrained public accommodations bill 
because he thought that was all he could get Congress to approve. 
At the last minute, however, he took the advice of Speaker of the 
House McCormack, who recommended sending up a broad mea-
sure and, if necessary, letting legislators whittle it down. The 
Whalens could easily have obtained this highly relevant information 
by reading Brauer's book.t7 
Their lack of legal expertise has also led them into error. For 
example, without giving a citation for the case, the Whalens mis-
quote's the Supreme Court's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson. Lawyers 
are likely to be even more disappointed by their failure to address 
the important constitutional and legal issues associated with the leg-
islative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The basic problem 
is that the Whalens' interest is in how Congress passed that law. 
They are not very concerned with what it enacted. Thus, while not-
ing that bipartisan "team captains" thoroughly explained each title 
of H. R. 715 2 in the Senate, they do not bother to share any of these 
explanations with their readers. Nor are the Whalens much inter-
ested in the constitutional authority of Congress to pass the Act. 
They entirely ignore the controversial decision of the Justice De-
partment to base the bill's public accommodations provisions (Title 
II) on the commerce clause, rather than on the fourteenth amend-
ment.t9 To find out that the head of the department's Civil Rights 
Division proposed this approach because of the Supreme Court's 
1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases, one must tum to Brauer's 
book. Likewise, one must consult Brauer to learn that liberal 
Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee insisted that Title 
II should be based on the fourteenth amendment, only to have the 
THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1879 (1965); K. STAMPP & L. LITWACK, RECON-
STRUCTION (1969). 
16. "Blacks benefitted economically from the New Deal .... " But seeR. WOLTERS, 
NEGROES AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 78-79, 213-15 (1970); Kirby, The Roosevelt Admin-
istration and Blacks: An Ambivalent Legacy, in TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 265, 273-
75 (B. Bernstein & A. Matusow 2d ed. 1972). 
17. C. BRAUER, supra note 8, at 266. 
18. They quote the Court as saying "that there should be ... 'separate but equal facili-
ties' for white and Negro." Although the name later given to the rule of the Plessy case, the 
phrase "separate but equal" does not appear in the Plessy opinion. See G. STONE, L. SEID-
MAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 454 (1986). 
19. The Supreme Court upheld Title II as a constitutionally proper exercise of the con-
gressional power to regulate interstate commerce in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
379 u.s. 241 (1964). 
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committee's ranking GOP member, William McCulloch, brush 
aside their objections to use of the commerce clause as "superficial." 
The Whalens also fail to mention the probing discussion of the con-
stitutional issue in the Senate Commerce Committee, for a synopsis 
of which interested lawyers must still look to Gerald Gunther's con-
stitutional law casebook. 
These authors also ignore several other legal issues. For exam-
ple, The Longest Debate provides no evidence about whether Lino 
Graglia was right when he charged that the legislative histories of 
Titles IV and VI show that the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare and the federal courts violated the intent of Congress 
when they interpreted the Act as requiring action to achieve racial 
balance in the public schools.2o Nor does this book shed any light 
on the issue of whether an agreement to deprive someone of rights 
created by Title II can be punished as a violation of the civil rights 
conspiracy statute.21 
These are questions that have troubled judges and legal schol-
ars, but they are not the sorts of things which interest the Whalens. 
Consequently, their book is likely to be dismissed by lawyers as use-
less, while it is rejected by historians as incompetent. These pas-
sionate amateurs have recreated the drama of one of the great 
congressional battles of the twentieth century, but they have not 
written a satisfactory legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Apparently, such a book is, as Senator Everett Dirksen might 
have said, an idea whose time has not yet come. 
POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW. Edited by 
Myres S. McDougall and W. Michael Reisman.2 Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 1985. Pp. xi, 460. $96.00. 
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These essays were written to honor Eugene Rostow on his 70th 
birthday and imminent retirement (in 1984) from the Yale Law 
20. L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 47-51 (1976). 
21. The FBI thought that it could be, but the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Georgia ruled otherwise in United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, 485 
(M.D. Ga. 1964). See generally Belknap, The Legal Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25 How. L.J. 
467, 480, 508 (1982). 
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